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Abstract—Layout camouflaging (LC) is a promising technique to
protect chip design intellectual property (IP) from reverse engineers.
Most prior art, however, cannot leverage the full potential of LC due to
excessive overheads and/or their limited scope on an FEOL-centric and
accordingly customized manufacturing process. If at all, most existing
techniques can be reasonably applied only to selected parts of a chip—
we argue that such “small-scale or custom camouflaging” will eventually
be circumvented, irrespective of the underlying technique.
In this work, we propose a novel LC scheme which is low-cost and
generic—full-chip LC can finally be realized without any reservation.
Our scheme is based on obfuscating the interconnects (BEOL); it can be
readily applied to any design without modifications in the device layer
(FEOL). Applied with split manufacturing in conjunction, our approach
is the first in the literature to cope with both the FEOL fab and the end-
user being untrustworthy. We implement and evaluate our primitives at
the (DRC-clean) layout level; our scheme incurs significantly lower cost
than most of the previous works. When comparing fully camouflaged
to original layouts (i.e., for 100% LC), we observe on average power,
performance, and area overheads of 12%, 30%, and 48%, respectively.
Here we also show empirically that most existing LC techniques (as
well as ours) can only provide proper resilience against powerful SAT
attacks once at least 50% of the layout is camouflaged—only large-scale
LC is practically secure. As indicated, our approach can deliver even
100% LC at acceptable cost. Finally, we also make our flow publicly
available, enabling the community to protect their sensitive designs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring the security and trustworthiness of hardware has become
a major concern in recent years [1]–[3]. One reason for protecting
the hardware is that intellectual property (IP) can otherwise be
duplicated without consent, resulting in a financial loss for the IP
owner. Furthermore, understanding the gate-level implementation of
a chip may advance other attacks such as side-channel analysis or
Trojan insertion [2], [3]. A malicious end-user, i.e., an adversary
without direct access to the design and fabrication process, has to
resort to reverse engineering (RE) of chips to obtain the IP. The
tools and know-how for RE attacks are becoming more advanced
and widely available, thus rendering RE a practical threat [2]–[6].
The goal of layout camouflaging (LC) is to mitigate RE attacks.1
The fundamental idea is to alter the behavior or appearance of a chip
such that it is arduous or even impossible for the RE attacker to infer
the chip’s real functionality. This can be achieved, e.g., by “look-
alike” or ambiguous gates [8], [9], by secretly configured multiplexers
(MUXes) [10], [11], or by threshold-dependent camouflaging of
gates [12]–[14]. We discuss the prior art further in Sec. II; besides,
a comprehensive overview on LC is given in [15].
On the cost of prior art: Most existing LC schemes have a high
layout cost and are accordingly limited for practical use. For example,
the ambiguous XOR-NAND-NOR gate proposed in [9] has 5.5×
power, 1.6× delay, and 4× area cost in comparison to a conventional
NAND gate. Even promising works such as the threshold-dependent,
1Hardware/layout obfuscation are wide-spread synonyms for LC. We use
the term obfuscation purposefully in the context of obfuscating the intercon-
nects, which is the key principle of our work. Besides, LC is closely related to
the concept of logic locking [7], which itself is also known as logic encryption.
n:1
n:1
Y
Regular FEOL
Obfuscated BEOL
a
w
b
x
Fig. 1. Our camouflaging concept is based on secret n:1 mappings in the
BEOL, which obfuscate the inputs for any regular gate (not only two-input
XOR). The set of possible functionalities depends on n:1, the selection of the
input nets, and the gate type.
full-chip LC proposed in [14] induces overheads of 14%, 82%, and
150% in power, performance, and area (PPA), respectively. Besides,
FEOL-based LC techniques are typically only available as customized
IP, and/or require some alterations for the FEOL manufacturing
process, incurring financial cost on top of PPA overheads.
In practice, existing LC schemes can be applied only selectively—
if at all—due to their inherent PPA overheads and their impact on the
FEOL processing. As a result, the constrained application of these
techniques may lead to a compromise in their security.
On the resilience of prior art: When LC techniques are applicable
only to parts of a chip, the challenge is where and to what extent
camouflaging shall be effected. Ideally, an attacker’s effort to obtain
the design from a carefully camouflaged netlist would be exponential
in the number of camouflaged gates [16]. Advances on the Boolean
satisfiability problem (SAT), however, have enabled powerful attacks
on LC (and on logic locking) [16]–[18]. The previously unforeseen
success of such SAT attacks stems from the typically small number of
input/output (I/O) patterns required in practice for de-camouflaging.
Recent works [19]–[21] aim for exponentially scaling and provably
secure LC but are still prone to other advanced attacks (Sec. II).
Accounting for the recent advances of analytical and invasive
attacks (Sec. II), we make the following case: to remain resilient, at
least as long as foreseeable, LC has to be applied at a large scale,
i.e., more than 50% of the layout should be camouflaged.
On this paper: Here we promote full-chip LC with high resilience
and low cost. To do so, we propose and evaluate simple but effective
LC primitives which are based on obfuscating (parts of) the inter-
connects. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) We enable resilient and full-chip LC, based on a novel, security-
and cost-driven approach for obfuscating the interconnects.
2) Our novel BEOL-centric LC primitives are tailored for regular
gates (Fig. 1). That is, our primitives do not require any
modification at the FEOL device layer and can, therefore, be
easily integrated into any (industrial) design flow. We make our
flow (based on Cadence Innovus) publicly available in [22].
3) The fact that our primitives implement BEOL-centric LC sug-
gests the (optional) application of split manufacturing [1], [3]
in conjunction. Doing so allows us for the first time to hinder
fab adversaries in addition to malicious end-users, all while
imposing only low commercial cost, which may be even com-
pensated for. Note that the implementation effort and cost of
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protecting against a malicious fab and malicious end-users have
been considered as mutually exclusive so far.
4) We assess the resilience of different flavors of our proposed
primitives and compare them against previous works on LC. In
that process, we employ powerful SAT attacks on traditional
benchmarks (which are relatively small) while we also show—
for the first time—attacks on large VLSI benchmarks. Besides,
we introduce the notion of practically secure LC, which seeks
to impose an excessive computational cost on SAT-based attacks
without inserting additional, dedicated circuit structures.
5) We conduct a thorough evaluation of camouflaged, DRC-clean
layouts. In contrast, most of the previous works investigate their
LC primitives only as stand-alone devices, without applying
them in actual layouts; we argue that this is overly optimistic.
Our work is one of the very few in the literature providing
comprehensive layout-level evaluation in general, and the first
to do so for large VLSI benchmarks with up to 39,014 gates.
II. BACKGROUND
Next, we discuss the recent progress on LC (along with demon-
strated and potential attacks), which is typically focused on FEOL-
centric camouflaging. Further, we discuss an early study on BEOL-
centric camouflaging, which also inspired our work to some degree.
A. Camouflaging at the FEOL and Vulnerabilities
As already mentioned, powerful SAT attacks have challenged most
prior art on LC (and logic locking) [16]–[18]. Thus, several recent
works on provably secure LC (and logic locking) [19]–[21] seek to
mitigate SAT attacks by inserting dedicated (but high-cost) structures
which in theory necessitate to consider an exponential number of I/O
patterns. However, we argue that the tailored structures of [19]–[21]
can be easy to identify during RE; these structures (i) are typically
applied only in a few places, due to their relatively high cost, and
(ii) rely on arrays of possibly camouflaged gates with their outputs
converging in large combinatorial trees. Moreover, the output wires
of these trees have been successfully identified by signal probability
analysis [23]. These critical wires may then be cut to circumvent
the security features.2 Besides, advanced SAT attacks have also been
demonstrated to mitigate provably secure or “cyclic” logic locking
techniques very recently [23], [25]–[28]. In short, a sophisticated
attacker may learn which gates to ignore, replace or cut off while
(nearly) recovering the original netlist of such SAT-hardened chips.
RE measures may render FEOL-centric LC also directly void,
without the assistance of analytical techniques. LC schemes such
as “look-alike” and ambiguous gates [8], [9] or secretly configured
MUXes [10], [11] rely on dummy contacts or dummy channels.
While it is often claimed by the authors of these studies that simple
etching cannot reveal these features, other powerful techniques/tools
are available. Specifically, the use of scanning electron microscopy
in the passive voltage contrast mode (SEM PVC in short) allows for
accurate and efficient measurement of charge accumulations; this has
been recently demonstrated by Courbon et al. [6] in an unprecedented
case study for reading out secured Flash memories. Now, SEM
PVC may break the above LC techniques as well, since dummy
contacts/channels will accumulate charges to a much lower degree
than real contacts/channels. Threshold-dependent camouflaging of
gates [12]–[14] can also be revealed by SEM PVC, as successfully
demonstrated by Sugawara et al. [5]. Besides, as the authors in [12]
indicate themselves, monitoring the etch rates can reveal different
doping levels which are at the heart of threshold-dependent gates.
2Wire cutting has been successfully demonstrated in the past, for example
by Helfmeier et al. [24], enabling such invasive attacks in principal.
B. Towards Camouflaging at the BEOL
Chen et al. [29] suggest implementing vias either as real, con-
ductive vias (using magnesium, Mg) or as dummy, non-conductive
vias (using magnesium oxide, MgO). That is, the authors advocate
BEOL-centric camouflaging besides the “classical LC” at the FEOL.
Despite their pioneering work on RE-resilient vias, Chen et al. did
not succeed to propose a resilient LC application, as we show in
Sec. VI. Also, note that our concept is different from [29]; we only
leverage their notion of Mg/MgO vias for obfuscation.
Chen et al. [29] elaborated that the use of Mg/MgO is practical
from both the perspectives of (i) manufacturability and (ii) RE
mitigation. For (i), it is noted that Mg has been traditionally used to
facilitate the bonding of copper interconnects to the dielectric layer.
For (ii), the authors fabricated samples and observed that Mg was
completely oxidized (into MgO) within a few minutes. That is, the
real Mg vias became indistinguishable from the dummy MgO vias
during RE. Independently, Swerts et al. [30] and Hwang et al. [31]
have used Mg and MgO during CMOS-centric BEOL processing
(without LC in mind). Hwang et al. have shown that Mg not only
oxidizes but also dissolves quickly—as does MgO—when surrounded
by fluids, which is inevitable in classical RE etching procedures.
Although one can argue that RE of Mg/MgO vias is somehow
possible nevertheless, such an attack is yet to be demonstrated.3 In
any case, our work relies only on the generic concept of RE-resilient
interconnects, and not on particular materials currently available
for high-volume manufacturing. Future interconnects, e.g., based on
carbon/graphene or spintronics [32], [33], may hinder RE as well.
It is important to note that RE-resilient interconnects are imple-
mented not only at the designer’s choice but also at the manufacturer’s
discretion. That is, this concept requires either split manufactur-
ing [1], [3] or a trusted BEOL process in conjunction.
Finally, another aspect of this concept is that its commercial cost
may be easily compensated for, even when split manufacturing is
applied. That is because it only requires additional BEOL masks
which are, e.g., for M5/M6 3.5–4× cheaper than the Poly masks at
16nm, according to industry experts. In contrast, most prior FEOL-
centric LC (but not threshold-dependent LC) incur a relatively high
cost for the different FEOL masks required. In general, any FEOL-
centric approach demands some alterations of IP libraries and/or for
the manufacturing process—such alterations are likely more costly
than camouflaging at the BEOL.
III. OUR CONCEPT AND THREAT MODEL
Our key idea is the following: we leverage the concept of RE-
resilient interconnects to design novel, BEOL-centric LC primitives
which are applicable to any type of regular gates.
Our concept: We implement n wires for each input of the gates
to be camouflaged, and each wire has—without loss of generality—
some of its vias obfuscated. In other words, we obfuscate the real
driving wires of any gate via secret n:1 mappings in the BEOL
(Figs. 1–3). As a result, the actual function which a gate implements
is obfuscated in a simple yet effective manner; the set of possible
functionalities depends on the selection of the wires, on n, and on
the gate itself. Note that our concept is generic and directly applicable
for any multi-input gates, and not only for two-input gates.
Since our concept employs obfuscation in the BEOL layers, it can
be readily applied in conjunction with split manufacturing, even with
3For example, we do not expect the powerful SEM PVC attack [6] to be
successful here. Once an attacker seeks to measure charges in the individual
BEOL layers, she/he will inevitably rip up all the interconnects during the
layer-wise RE process. Hence, a localized lack of charges will hint on any
non-functional wire, be it an obfuscated dummy or a ripped-up regular wire.
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low commercial cost on top (i.e., at least when splitting at higher
metal layers—which we do by splitting at M5, see also Sec. VI).
Our threat model: We assume both the end-user and the fab to
be untrusted. The latter is in strong contrast to most prior art on LC
that has to trust the fab because of their FEOL-centric techniques.
To hinder fab adversaries, i.e., in particular to protect the secret
mappings in the BEOL layers, we leverage split manufacturing.4 The
goal of malicious end-users is to RE the chip’s gate-level layout
and identify its secret mappings in the BEOL layers—the latter is
challenging and yet to be demonstrated (Sec. II). Ultimately, both
adversaries want to reconstruct the original netlist and its IP. Towards
this end, end-users can use another working chip copy as an oracle for
SAT attacks, whereas fab workers can launch proximity attacks [34].
IV. ON DIFFERENT FLAVORS OF OUR PRIMITIVE
Here, we shed light on several flavors of our LC scheme. We
assess all flavors by (i) their impact on PPA and (ii) their SAT attack
resilience. To do so, we (i) conduct a thorough GDSII-level analysis
and (ii) employ powerful SAT attacks as proposed in [17]. For the
latter, the authors made their attack tool publicly available [35]; other
recent attacks proposed in, e.g., [18], [25]–[28] have not been made
available to us. We camouflage the layouts in the range of 10% to
100%, in steps of 10%. Further setup details are given in Sec. VI.
Without loss of generality, we exemplarily discuss our primitives
when applied for two-input gates in the following.
A. Basic Flavor, with Simple n:1 Mappings
2:1 mapping: We first explore the most basic flavor with two wires
for each gate’s input, i.e., one dummy wire and one real wire.
This flavor comprises only four functionalities. For example, with
a,w being the wires for one input, and b, x being the wires for the
other input (see also Fig. 1), the gate can implement either f(a, b),
f(a, x), f(w, b), or f(w, x), where f is the functionality of the
gate. It is easy to see that even less than four functions are realized
when some wires are driven by the same net. We avoid this—for all
flavors—by selecting unique nets for each gate’s wires (see Sec. V).
We expect and observe this flavor to break relatively easily against
the attacks we leverage from [17]. For benchmarks apex4 and des,
e.g., the attack terminates within 100–300 seconds, even for large-
scale LC (i.e., for 50%). Compared to our other flavors, this one has
the weakest resilience to SAT attacks. Hence, we did not consider the
further application or layout-level evaluation of this basic primitive.
3:1 mapping: We extend the basic scheme by adding one more
dummy wire for each input (Fig. 2). This primitive cloaks one out of
nine possible functionalities; hence, we can expect a higher resilience
when compared to the 2:1 mapping primitive. In fact, we observe
that the resilience scales well across all ranges of LC for this 3:1
primitive and, thus, is enforcing reasonably high efforts for SAT
attacks, especially for larger benchmarks such as b15. On average, the
attack runtime scales by ≈3× when compared to the 2:1 primitive.
On the flip side, we observe relatively high PPA cost for this
primitive, especially for performance/delay; on average, the delay
overhead approaches 60% when “only” 50% of the layout is camou-
flaged. That is because we need to choose all the wires such that they
are unique for any gate (as already indicated) and, as a result, the
more the camouflaging, the higher the routing congestion. In turn,
this increases wirelength and capacitive loads, which simultaneously
aggravates delay and power, imposing practical limitations for large-
scale LC using this basic 3:1 mapping primitive.
4In a weaker threat model where the fab is trusted, our technique can still
be directly applied, just without split manufacturing.
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Fig. 2. Our basic primitive with secret 3:1 mappings, resulting in up to 9
possible functions for the gate.
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Fig. 3. Our extended, final primitive, where the fixed logic values of 0 and
1 are employed along with two regular signal nets/wires. Depending on the
gate type, 10 or 14 functions are possible.
B. Extended Flavor, with Fixed Logic Values
A promising option is to additionally employ the fixed logic values
0 and 1 along with regular nets/wires (Fig. 3). According to Boolean
algebra and considering the underlying gate, this extended primitive
provides either 5m or 7m functionalities, where m is the number of
regular wires for each input (in addition to the two wires with the
fixed values 0 and 1). For example for m = 2, with a,w and b, x as
the respective regular wires for the two inputs, and with XOR as the
underlying gate (Fig. 3), we obtain the following 14 functionalities:
0, 1, a, w, b, x, a, w, b, x, a⊕ b, a⊕ x, w ⊕ b, and w ⊕ x.
We note that this approach enables significantly lower PPA cost.
That is, for m = 1, the average delay overhead is only ≈10% when
50% of the layout is camouflaged, and for m = 2, the average delay
overhead is still only ≈20–30%, even when 50–100% of the layout is
camouflaged. When compared to employing only regular nets/wires,
the additional use of 0 and 1 offers a fundamental benefit: their fixed-
value wires are not switching, thus exhibiting only negligible power
consumption and imposing no timing overhead.
We expect the SAT attack resilience of this extended primitive to
be “in between” the two basic primitives, i.e., at least for m = 1. Our
experiments corroborate this expectation; for m = 1, this primitive
offers on average a lower resilience than 3:1 mapping (effecting 25–
30% less attack runtime), but a higher resilience than 2:1 mapping
(≈35% more runtime) when the same set of gates are camouflaged.
To further strengthen the resilience, we may add more regular wires
(i.e., increase m), thereby extending the set of possible functionalities.
This will directly impact the overall search space and, as a result, in-
crease the average effort required for SAT attacks [19]. Adding more
wires (to be driven by unique nets), however, notably contributes
to routing congestion which aggravates PPA cost in turn. In short,
we empirically choose m = 2 for our final primitive (Fig. 3). We
elaborate on this final primitive in Sec. VI in detail.
V. OUR CAMOUFLAGING METHODOLOGY
A. Protecting Fixed Values and “Implausible Functions”
As indicated above, our final primitive appears attractive due to its
relatively low PPA cost and its adequate resilience (see also Sec. VI).
For large-scale LC, however, the ubiquitous wires relating to fixed
values may give away clues to an attacker; fixed values are typically
used only for special registers or “hardware mode flags.” An attacker
observing a vast number of fixed-value wires—which itself may be
easy, given that such wires are typically connected to distinct TIE
cells—might rightfully assume that these wires have been introduced
for obfuscation. Thus, unless we make these wires essential for large
parts of the design, an attacker may readily and safely disregard them.
We have to address another, complementary challenge at once. That
is, a mindful attacker may also try to rule out all the “implausible”
3
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Fig. 4. An inverter transformed into a two-input NAND gate. The real
nets/wires are underlined and shown in red.
functions (i.e., INV, BUF, 0 and 1) which are those beyond any gate’s
original functionality. Since these additional functions arise only due
to the fixed values being part of the obfuscated inputs to begin with,
they can only become effective once the fixed values are an essential
part of the design (and vice versa).
In short, the fixed-value wires have to be rendered essential, while
also protecting all the “implausible functions” at the same time.5 To
do so, we perform simple netlist transformations as follows:
1) We transform some inverters (INVs) and buffers (BUFs) into
gates of other types (e.g., see Fig. 4). Nowadays, around 50%
of all gates are repeaters (INV/BUF) [37], [38], offering ample
opportunities for large-scale transformations/camouflaging. Here
one can freely choose the number of INVs/BUFs to camouflage,
and the type of gate (AND, NAND, OR, NOR, XOR, XNOR) to
transform them into. The best strategy, which we also apply, is to
randomly transform 50% of INVs/BUFs. This way, an attacker
cannot easily infer a direct correspondence between any of those
gates and their functionality. Note how this transformation ren-
ders the fixed values essential—they cannot be ignored without
misinterpreting the transformed gates. Also, the functionalities
INV and BUF remain plausible now throughout the layout.
2) We insert some additional gates (into randomly selected regions
of whitespace) with their real inputs tied to fixed values. These
gates act as TIE cells in disguise; they “drive” other camouflaged
gates in turn. Thus, also the functionalities 0 and 1 cannot be
ignored anymore without misinterpreting the transformed netlist.
B. Overall Flow
Here we provide an overview of our camouflaging methodology
(Fig. 5), which can be easily integrated into any design flow. In this
work, we implement our methodology for Cadence Innovus. We also
provide open access to our flow in [22].
Given an HDL netlist, we initially synthesize, place, and route the
design. On this original layout, we then apply our transformations
outlined above. Next, we insert and wire obfuscating cells for all the
inputs of each gate to be camouflaged. It is essential to understand
that these custom cells do not impact the FEOL layer—their sole
purpose is to enable the routing of all dummy and real wires (Fig. 6).
Hence, the physical design of these custom cells is tailored for
routability, while their arrangement remains flexible and unconfined
regarding the already placed standard cells (see also Sec. V-C).
For our final primitive, recall that there are four obfuscated wires
for each input (i.e., for each obfuscating cell, Fig. 6): two wires
connect to 1 and 0 (either randomly with regular TIE cells or with
gates acting as TIE cells in disguise), one wire connects with the real
net, and one wire with a dummy net. In case 1 or 0 is the desired
input—i.e., when the gate shall implement INV, BUF, or a TIE cell in
disguise—the real net is either replaced with another unique dummy
net or “driven” by another of the disguised TIE cells.
As indicated in Sec. IV, we have to choose dummy nets carefully
such that they are unique with respect to each gate to camouflage.
5Independent from our work, Keshavarz et al. [36] recently called for
maintaining the plausibility of all (chip-level) viable functionalities, albeit with
a focus on logic synthesis and technology mapping, and without assuming that
a working chip is available as an oracle for the (SAT-centric) attacks.
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Fig. 5. Flow of our layout-level, BEOL-centric camouflaging methodology.
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Fig. 6. Wiring and vias for our obfuscating cell; the concept for the BEOL
is illustrated in (a) and the physical-design view in (b). Note that the actual
wiring in M5/M6 depends on which vias are dummy and which are real. In (a),
the dummy/real vias are indicated as red crosses/green circle. In this example,
the real net is labeled a, and it connects to pin C in (b); the camouflaged gate’s
input in (a) is wired with pin Y in (b). As for (b), the pins A, B, and Y reside
in M6 (orange, vertical wiring), whereas pins C and D are set up in M5 (red,
horizontal wiring). The vias (all between M5 and M6) are represented by the
pins and either colored in orange (dummy vias) or in green (real via). Also
note the cell’s grey outline beneath the pins; the latter are partially located
outside the cell, which is feasible/supported. The minimal width of the cell
is solely to ease its visual differentiation from standard cells at design time.
We do so by applying a local spatial search around each gate’s
inputs; nearby nets/wires are preferably selected to limit the routing
congestion. We also check for combinatorial loops which may have
resulted during that process, and re-select dummy nets as required.
After embedding and connecting the obfuscating cells, we perform
an ECO optimization and legalization; the latter is also based on
custom constraint rules (Sec. V-C). At the same time, we re-route
the design—now with all the dummy wires along with the real wires.
We perform final design closure, remove the obfuscating cells from
the design, re-extract the RC data, and finally gather PPA numbers.
C. Physical Design of the Obfuscating Cell
We implemented the obfuscating cell as a custom cell and extended
the LIB/LEF files. Here we elaborate on the cell’s physical design.
1) The cell has four input pins and one output pin (Fig. 6(b)). The
pins have been set up in two metal layers: pins A, B, and Y
reside in M6, whereas pins C and D are set up in M5. We have
chosen two different layers to minimize the routing congestion;
in exploratory experiments with all pins in M6, we observed
overly high congestion, especially for LC beyond 50%. Note
that one can easily tailor the pins for different layers as well
(e.g., M7/M8), if considered useful for particular designs.
2) The dimensions of the pins (0.14×0.14µm) and their offsets are
chosen such that the pins can be placed directly on the respective
metal layer’s tracks (thin yellow grid in Fig. 6(b)); this is to
further minimize the routing congestion.
3) We define custom constraint rules which prevent the pins of
different obfuscating cells to overlap during legalization. These
obfuscating cells can, however, freely overlap with any standard
cell without inducing routing conflicts. That is because standard
cells have their pins exclusively in the lower metal layers.
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FEOL
BEOLcw1
cw2
cp2
cp1
Fig. 7. The capacitance cp1 for any input pin of the obfuscating cell is to be
annotated, to account for both the wire capacitance cw2 and the camouflaged
gate’s input-pin capacitance cp2. Otherwise, the respective driver’s load would
be underestimated during ECO optimization.
4) We leverage the timing and power characteristics of BUFX2,
i.e., a buffer with driving strength of 2. Note that a detailed
library characterization is not required as the obfuscating cell
only implements BEOL wires and vias. However, we have to set
up an annotation regarding the pin capacitances (Fig. 7). This
is essential to enable proper ECO optimization and to evaluate
the final PPA numbers.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION
Setup for layout evaluation: We implement our methodology as
custom scripts for Cadence Innovus 15.1; all our procedures incur
negligible runtime cost. We employ the public NanGate 45nm Open
Cell Library [39] with ten metal layers. The PPA analysis is carried
out for 0.95V, 125◦C, and the slow process corner, along with a
default input switching activity of 0.2—note that this is a rather
conservative setup. Power and timing results are obtained by Innovus
as well. We configure the initial utilization rates (i.e., for the original
layouts) such that the routing congestion remains below 1%.
Recall that we seek to safeguard our camouflaged layouts also
from fab adversaries and that we employ split manufacturing towards
this end (Sec. III). We suggest splitting at M5, i.e., just beneath the
Mg/MgO vias which represent our secret assets to be protected.6
Setup for security evaluation: We implement all LC techniques
proposed in [9]–[11], [41] for the sake of comparison with our work.
For a fair evaluation, the same sets of gates are camouflaged across all
LC techniques: for a given benchmark, gates are randomly selected
once and then memorized.7 Ten different sets are generated for each
benchmark, ranging from 10% to 100% LC, in steps of 10%.
Recall that we evaluate the LC primitives against powerful SAT
attacks [17] which are publicly available [35]. Note that the tool [35]
was developed for logic locking but is still applicable for our study;
logic locking and LC are closely related and can be transformed
into one another [42]. All the SAT attacks are executed on a server
with five compute nodes, where each node has two 14-core Intel
Broadwell processors, running at 2.4 GHz with 128 GB RAM. The
CPU time-out (“t-o”) is set to 48 hours.
We attribute both the runtime and the growth trend for clauses
as primary indicators for a design’s resilience. The latter is helpful
6Xiao et al. [40] noted that splitting at higher metal layers imposes relatively
low efforts; higher layers have rather large pitches, which are easy and cheap
to manufacture by the trusted (low-end) BEOL facility. Besides cost and
practicability, however, we acknowledge that Wang et al. [34] argued that
splitting at M5 may not be secure, based on their advanced proximity attack.
Here it is important to note that our approach allows splitting beneath M5
without any restriction. Moreover, we observe in exploratory experiments
that our LC scheme inherently helps mitigating such proximity attacks. More
specifically, after fully camouflaging 14 selected designs, splitting their layouts
at M5, and running the attack of [34] against the FEOL layouts, we observe
correct connections of only 22.5% on average. We believe that is because all
camouflaged gates are routed through M6 and above. Especially for large-
scale LC, thus, our scheme induces a plethora of open nets (i.e., nets that are
cut across FEOL and BEOL) which is challenging for any such proximity
attack. A more detailed study will be the scope of our future work.
7Besides random selection, any other technique such as maximum clique [9]
can be applied as well. Somewhat surprisingly, Massad et al. [16] observe that
random selection is on average almost as effective.
TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED BENCHMARKS (THOSE IN ITALICS ARE
FROM THE EPFL SUITE [43], OTHERS ARE FROM TRADITIONAL SUITES)
Benchmark Inputs Outputs Gate Count
aes core 789 668 39,014
b14 277 299 11,028
b15 485 519 10,354
b17 1,452 1,512 36,770
b22 767 757 33,110
c7552 207 108 4,045
des 256 245 6,473
diffeq1 354 289 30,584
square 64 127 28,148
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Fig. 8. Layout cost for aes core [43] using our final LC primitive, with the
baseline being the original layout. The discrete and monotonous area cost is
due to a step-wise up-scaling of die outlines as needed; see also below.
for large-scale LC when monitoring the attack runtimes becomes
prohibitive. Specifically, the trend of clauses indicates whether the
SAT solver can simplify the structures in the camouflaged design at
all [42]. In case the number of clauses is continuously (and linearly)
increasing, i.e., the saturation of clauses is not reached, we can
conclude that the attack will not finalize in foreseeable time.
Benchmarks: We conduct extensive experiments on traditional
benchmarks suites (ISCAS-85, MCNC, and ITC-99) and, for the first
time, also on the large-scale EPFL MIG suite [43]. For the latter,
we compile the original circuits, not the MIG versions. Selected
benchmarks are reviewed in Table I; we consider 34 benchmarks
in total, however. Note that all benchmarks are combinatorial, but
our approach can be directly applied to sequential designs as well.
A. Layout Evaluation
Here we report on general trends for PPA cost regarding our final
LC primitive, and we also compare to previous works. Figure 8
illustrates the cost for benchmark aes core [43], and Table II reports
the cost for this and other benchmarks used in this work.
On die area: Recall that our obfuscating cells do not tangent the
standard-cell area; the reported cost is thus concerning the die outline.
Especially for large-scale camouflaging, we have to scale up the die
outlines to mitigate routing/DRC errors. For the sake of simplicity,
we scale up the outlines in view of decreasing the utilization rate in
steps of 0.1. For example, while relaxing the utilization from 0.5 to
0.4, the die area has to be increased by 25%. As this technique can
be rather profuse, we like to note that a more conservative up-scaling
may enable less area overhead.
The overheads are typically not more than 25% for up to 60% LC,
whereas for 100% LC, we note an average area cost close to 50%.
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TABLE II
OUR GDSII-LEVEL COST IN % FOR LARGE-SCALE LC (IN % OF ALL GATES) ON SELECTED BENCHMARKS
Benchmark Utilization for 20% LC 40% LC 60% LC 80% LC 100% LCOriginal Layout Area Power Delay Area Power Delay Area Power Delay Area Power Delay Area Power Delay
aes core 0.4 0 1.6 17.9 0 3.1 18.4 33.3 5.5 23.1 33.3 6.1 30.4 33.3 11.6 37.6
b14 0.5 0 2.3 8.1 0 5.3 9.2 0 11.4 17.9 25.0 14.6 21.1 25.0 15.1 22.1
b15 0.5 0 2.3 13.8 0 6.1 21.8 25.0 7.2 25.1 25.0 8.5 27.4 25.0 12.7 41.5
b17 0.5 0 2.8 15.5 25.0 2.7 28.6 25.0 4.9 31.2 66.7 6.6 30.3 66.7 8.7 36.9
b22 0.6 0 3.7 9.3 20.0 4.6 16.4 20.0 6.1 17.4 50.0 11.2 26.2 50.0 19.0 31.9
diffeq1 0.5 0 3.5 14.9 25.0 8.6 25.8 25.0 6.0 12.3 66.7 8.2 13.6 66.7 10.2 16.3
square 0.5 0 1.8 10.1 25.0 3.6 13.9 25.0 4.6 15.1 66.7 5.4 16.4 66.7 8.2 24.8
Average 0.5 0 2.6 12.8 13.6 4.9 19.2 21.9 6.5 20.3 47.6 8.7 23.6 47.6 12.2 30.2
Again, these overheads enable DRC-clean layouts even for full-chip
camouflaging—we believe that this is a justifiable achievement.
On power and performance: Recall that our primitive has all its
wires routed in higher metal layers; see also Fig. 9. Hence, an impact
on power and performance is expected.
Interestingly, for camouflaging up until 60% of the layout, the
average overheads are relatively small, typically in the range of 2–
7% for power and 12–21% for delay. The overheads increase for
larger and full-scale LC, but still follow a linear growth. We believe
that these two trends are due to the following:
1) Besides the transformed INV/BUF gates, all gates remain as is;
we experience no inherent overheads for the majority of gates.
2) The relatively low resistance of the higher metal layers used by
our primitive helps to limit the delay cost for LC.
3) The ubiquitous nets for the fixed values 0 and 1 are not switching
and, thus, they neither increase power nor delay.
4) For LC beyond 60%, the positive effects above are offset by
the steady increase of the wiring for camouflaged gates, thereby
raising the routing congestion. Since routing congestion can only
be managed by re-routing in some detours, this lengthens parts
of the wires further. In turn, this also impacts power and delay.
Comparison on layout level: Recall that our work is one of the
very few to evaluate LC on placed and routed GDSII designs. When
contrasting to a previous study, conducted by Malik et al. [41], we
observe significantly lower overheads; such a qualitative comparison
is fair as the authors use the same NanGate library [39]. Specifically,
Malik et al. reported overheads of 7.09×, 6.45×, and 3.12× for area,
power, and delay, respectively. It is also important to note that Malik
et al. implement and evaluate their approach for one AES S-box,
which has a far lower number of gates—namely only 421—when
compared to all the benchmarks we consider. The authors indicate
themselves that the cost will increase for larger circuits [41].
For Zhang’s work [11], as its MUX-based primitive is not publicly
available, we implement it ourselves, and perform a detailed layout-
level evaluation. For example, we observe 464%, 638%, and 63%
increase in area, power, and delay, respectively, when camouflaging
all the gates for the ISCAS-85 benchmark c7552. These numbers are
8.3×, 55.4×, and 2.18× higher than ours for the same scenario.
Besides advocating a provably secure LC scheme, Li et al. [19] also
propose two different LC primitives, called STF-type and XOR-type.
As the authors report only gate-level cost, we conduct a layout-level
evaluation ourselves as well (Table III). Here we map the numbers
reported for their primitives to regular gates of the respective type—
doing so is fair and conservative as it implies only a linear scaling.
Comparison on gate level: Previous works typically report their
cost only for small-scale LC, which arguably is their sole scope. For
example, the MUX-based approach of [10] exhibits on average 50%
delay overhead and 15% area overhead already for 5% LC.
We also like to note that most prior art report numbers based on
RTL simulations, which seems too optimistic, especially for large-
Fig. 9. Metal layers M5 to M10 for benchmark aes core [43]; the original
layout is on the left and the layout with 100% LC is on the right.
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF AREA (A), POWER (P), AND DELAY (D) FOR 100% LC
ON SELECTED BENCHMARKS (N/A MEANS NOT AVAILABLE)
Benchmark XOR-type [19] STF-type [19] [14] OursA P D A P D A P D A P D
apex4 59.7 5.9 45.1 51.3 18.8 45.3 N/A N/A N/A 50.0 17.5 41.8
c432 51.1 19.3 9.8 38.9 32.6 24.3 140.0 8.0 96.0 62.5 25.3 26.8
c5315 96.3 27.4 51.1 70.1 44.3 59.8 200.0 10.0 76.0 55.6 17.5 42.2
c7552 96.6 30.0 66.8 59.7 40.0 63.8 175.0 9.0 90.0 55.6 11.5 28.9
b14 74.8 14.2 39.6 57.6 36.6 39.2 N/A N/A N/A 25.0 15.1 22.1
b17 71.3 3.3 53.0 53.4 20.9 58.9 N/A N/A N/A 66.7 8.7 36.9
b20 78.5 16.4 46.0 62.6 40.9 72.2 N/A N/A N/A 50.0 15.1 30.1
Average 75.5 16.6 44.5 56.2 33.4 51.9 171.7 9.0 87.3 52.2 15.8 32.7
scale LC. Conservatively assuming that these numbers would still
scale only linearly, the primitive of [9] would incur ≈600%, ≈400%,
and ≈300% cost on area, power, and delay, i.e., with 50% of the gates
camouflaged. For the same scenario, our technique incurs only 16.7%,
6.9%, and 12.8% overheads for area, power, and delay, respectively.
That is, we attain 36×, 58×, and 23× lower overheads.
Comparison with threshold-dependent LC: Nirmala et al. [13]
recently proposed a promising concept of threshold-dependent LC
switches. Also here we apply a thorough layout-level evaluation,
across 34 benchmarks, based on their numbers reported for their
primitives. As a result, we find that this approach will incur significant
layout cost for full-chip LC: ≈1,360%, ≈1,266%, and ≈100% for
area, power, and delay, respectively. For [12], we observe a linear
trend in the reported layout cost; extrapolating those numbers for
full-chip LC would translate to ≈78% and ≈147% for power and
delay, respectively. Finally, for the work of Erbagci et al. [14], we
report their numbers in Table III for comparison.
Comparison with provably secure LC: Recall that [19]–[21]
rely on additional circuitry to protect individual, selected gates/wires.
Such circuitry can incur a high cost, especially for area. For example
in Xie et al.’s work [21], when protecting one gate/wire of the c7552
benchmark using 64 key bits, the die-level area overhead we observe
6
© IEEE, 2017. This is the author’s version of the work. It is posted here for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive
version of Record was published in Proc. International Conference On Computer Aided Design (ICCAD) 2017
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICCAD.2017.8203758
TABLE IV
RUNTIME FOR OUR SAT ATTACKS (USING [35]) ON SELECTED DESIGNS, IN SECONDS (TIME-OUT T-O IS 172,800 SECONDS, I.E., 48 HOURS)
Benchmark 10% LC 20% LC 30% LC 40/50–100% LC[9] [41] [10] [11] Our [9] [41] [10] [11] Our [9] [41] [10] [11] Our [9] [41] [10] [11] Our
aes core 703 t-o t-o 162 6,732 4,779 t-o t-o 470 t-o 6,783 t-o t-o 2,304 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
ac97 ctrl 102 t-o 3,271 37 1,723 346 t-o t-o 97 8,678 4,211 t-o t-o 589 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
b15 423 t-o t-o 65 583 5,163 t-o t-o 331 10,012 5,163 t-o t-o 3,306 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
b17 7,894 t-o t-o 1,340 t-o t-o t-o t-o 6,041 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
c7552 39 1,686 2,429 12 68 160 t-o t-o 103 8,486 1,589 t-o t-o 746 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
diffeq1 t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
square t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o t-o
in our layout-level implementation of their work is close to 106%.8
If we were to protect more gates/wires, the overhead would scale up
accordingly. In contrast, when camouflaging all gates of the same
circuit, our approach incurs only ≈56% overhead for the die area.
B. Security Evaluation
Recall that our primary objective is large-scale LC; an important
observation is that this achieves practically secure LC. That is, by
camouflaging up to 100% of the layout, we seek to induce the
highest computational effort possible for SAT attacks, at least without
inserting additional provably secure structures.
On the notion of practically secure LC: It is not straightforward
to prove beforehand to what extent large-scale LC will render a layout
(practically) secure without leveraging a SAT solver’s capabilities for
de-camouflaging. Li et al. [19] have shown that the effort for de-
camouflaging scales on average with both (i) the solution space C
concerning all the possible functionalities for the whole, camouflaged
design and (ii) the Hamming distance among those different func-
tionalities. In turn, the key reason why a further theoretical evaluation
of large-scale LC is so difficult is that the space of C (and thereby
the Hamming distance as well) depends on (a) the types and count
of possible functionalities for all employed LC primitives, (b) the
count and selection of gates to camouflage, and (c) the connectivity
among all gates in the design, all at the same time. On the one hand,
for example, designs containing XOR/XNOR and/or multipliers are
harder to de-camouflage in practice [17], [42]. On the other hand,
as with classical logic minimization, the solution space of some
interconnected camouflaged gates (but not for [N]AND-trees) may
be largely simplified during the SAT search.
In short, while we can easily estimate the upper bound of C, it
may be far from the actual number of functions required to consider,
depending on the design. This implies that without conducting SAT
attacks (or similar techniques), there is no basis for a fair evaluation
of different LC schemes. Hence we resort to such an empirical but
comprehensive study, also to contrast our work to prior art.
As we observe in this study, we can indeed expect prohibitive
runtimes for large-scale LC. More specifically, e.g., we extrapolate
that de-camouflaging aes core (when all 39,014 gates are camou-
flaged using our primitive) can take approximately 108 years.9 Similar
observations have also been made by Yu et al. [42], albeit for a
different primitive and the much smaller benchmark c432 (209 two-
input gates); even this layout could not be resolved within three days.
Comparative study on the resilience of LC: In Table IV, we list
the runtime for SAT attacks on camouflaged designs, contrasting our
LC primitive and those of [9]–[11], [41]. Note that these prior studies
did not report on any SAT attacks. Thus, we model their primitives
ourselves as outlined in [17], [42]. Also, recall that we camouflage
the same sets of gates across all techniques for a fair comparison.
8Since these studies [19]–[21] are all based on the same principle (inserting
combinatorial trees), we can also expect similar trends for the other schemes.
9For a meaningful regression, we sample the average attack runtimes across
70 different sets of randomly camouflaged gates.
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Fig. 10. The progress of our SAT attacks (using [35]) on our LC implemen-
tation (main plot) and [21] (inset). For ours, 10% and 20% LC is resolved;
the larger setups incur time-out (48 hours) and excessive numbers of clauses.
For [21], neither setups (32- and 64-bit keys) are resolved before time-out.
It is noteworthy that none of the layouts can be de-camouflaged
within 48 hours once full-chip LC is applied. In fact, all layouts
remain already resilient just beyond 40/50% LC. We ran further
exploratory attacks for 7 days on large-scale LC using our primitive—
without observing any improvement. We can reasonably expect other
prior art, such as the XOR-type/STF-type gates of [19], to perform
comparably well for large-scale LC (i.e., at least on the same
benchmarks). That is because the set of possible functionalities which
these prior studies implement are typically within the same range.
For a more meaningful comparison, we also consider relatively
small scales for LC (10% up to 30%). Here, the primitive advocated
by Zhang [11] appears as the weakest, and the one proposed by Malik
et al. [41] seems the most resilient. Our primitive is next only to that
of Wang et al. [10] and that of Malik et al. [41]. Now, it is also
important to recall that our proposed technique incurs significantly
smaller PPA cost than these schemes [10], [41].
In short, we argue that our proposed technique is currently the only
resilient yet practical solution towards large-scale LC.
On the SAT-attack effort against large-scale LC: Recall that
the growth of clauses hints on any SAT attack’s progress [42].
When employing our primitive for small-scale LC, the number of
clauses saturates at some point, and the layout can be de-camouflaged
within 48 hours (Fig. 10). On the contrary, for large-scale LC (again,
which has not been resolved), we observe that the number of clauses
increases continuously. We found a similar trend when conducting
attacks on [21] (Fig. 10, inset). This similarity indicates that attacks
on our primitive—once it is applied at large scales—require enormous
efforts, similar to attacks on SAT-hardened primitives such as [21].
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TABLE V
RUNTIME FOR SAT ATTACKS ON [29], ENABLED BY [35], IN SECONDS
(COLUMNS N1–N3 DENOTE THE NUMBER OF DUMMY WIRES ADDED
WHILE LIMITING THE DELAY OVERHEAD TO 0%, 3%, AND 5%,
RESPECTIVELY, AS PROPOSED IN [29])
Benchmark N1 Time N2 Time N3 Time
b14 30 7 36 9 55 11
b15 38 7 44 8 84 15
b17 92 149 198 170 272 214
b18 265 2,964 334 3,223 518 3,816
b19 438 4,685 583 5,393 893 7,684
b20 48 35 85 46 166 70
b21 54 29 76 56 168 63
b22 76 58 113 79 191 128
Overall, we are not claiming that large-scale LC (using our prim-
itive or prior art) cannot be resolved eventually using SAT attacks.
Rather, we provide strong empirical evidence that such practically
secure LC (i.e., once 50–100% of all gates are camouflaged) imposes
a prohibitive computational cost on SAT solvers. Besides, while the
SAT-solver capabilities are only going to increase, physical limits for
computation will remain in any case [16], [38].
On the resilience of [29]: Since our work is inspired by [29] to
some degree, it seems imperative to investigate its resilience as well.
We model the attack on [29] as outlined in Fig. 3 of [42]. It can be
seen from Table V that the SAT attacks can distinguish between real
and dummy interconnects within a relatively short time, no matter
how many interconnects are obfuscated (i.e., at least concerning the
delay constraints defined in [29]). That is, an overly constrained
obfuscation as proposed in [29] cannot withstand powerful SAT
attacks. Similar observations have been reported by Yu et al. [42].
VII. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We show in this work that most techniques for layout camouflaging
(LC) are only resilient to powerful SAT attacks once more than 50%
of the entire chip is camouflaged. We extend this call for large-
scale LC also towards SAT-hardened and advanced LC techniques,
to thwart up-and-coming customized and/or invasive attacks.
We promote the obfuscation of interconnects as another promising
avenue for LC. Towards this end, we propose and implement BEOL-
centric but generic LC primitives (which are applicable to any FEOL
node), thoroughly contrast them to the prior art, and make our design
flow publicly available in [22]. We have leveraged powerful SAT
attacks and LC schemes proposed in the literature and provided a
comprehensive and fair evaluation. Further, we strive for practically
relevant layout evaluation; all our camouflaged layouts are DRC-
clean at the GDSII level. The proposed scheme is the first (to
the best of our knowledge) that can deliver low-cost and resilient
full-chip camouflaging, i.e., when considering both the layout and
manufacturing cost as well as the readily deployable protection
against fab adversaries enabled by split manufacturing.
In future work, we will elaborate in more detail on the cost and
security for split manufacturing enabled by our LC primitive.
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